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ere is an old folk song (which I know as Scottish, but which folklorists have evidently 
traced to seventeen diﬀerent countries) called “e Devil and the Feathery Wife.” A 
man made wealthy by the devil, after seven years, has to present him with a beast. If 
the Devil can say what the beast is, the man has to forfeit his soul. If the Devil cannot 
name the beast, however, the man is free to enjoy his wealth. At the end of seven years 
the man is rescued by his wife, who rolls herself in birdlime and feathers. e Devil 
is thwarted when he admits, “I’m damned if I know what it is” (see Ian Spring, “e 
Devil and the Feathery Wife,” Folklore, 99, 1988, 139-45). As I read Lisa T. Sarasohn’s 
Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish, I found myself likening the Duchess of 
Newcastle to the feathery wife. Even at the end of the book, I felt no closer to under-
standing who she was, or what she believed she was doing; certainly, like the feathery 
wife, she was a very strange beast indeed. 
For many of her contemporaries, as occasional reported comments make clear, she 
was simply “Mad Meg.” For the most part, these assumptions were based on her dress 
and her demeanour, but those who knew her writings also thought them distinctly 
odd, even if they were too polite to say so. Take for example her repeated notion that 
our thoughts are suggestions from fairies who dwell in our heads (pp. 17, 48). “e 
Fairies in the Braine,” she once wrote, “may be the causes of many thoughts” (p. 50). 
It is impossible to know with any certainty what to make of these remarks, but one 
possible interpretation is that she experienced some of her thoughts as “voices” in her 
head (and assumed, quite naturally, that everybody else did too). Unfortunately, 
Sarasohn does not help with this. Preferring to concentrate on supposed similarities 
in Cavendish’s writings between fairies and atoms—similarities which Sarasohn sees 
as marking a fusion of the two (though it is not at all clear what she means by that; as 
far as I can tell, Cavendish believed fairies, like everything else, were made of atoms)—
Sarasohn tries to put a positive gloss on Cavendish’s state of mind: “e fusion of 
fairies and atoms underscores the unity of her work, in which both natural philosophy 
and fantasy function as complementary products of a unitary mind” (p. 53).
Given the subtitle of Sarasohn’s book, I was expecting a careful examination of the 
relationship between Cavendish’s writings in the realm of fantasy and those where she 
tried to develop serious philosophical claims. Clearly, some of her philosophical ideas 
featured in more or less modiﬁed forms in her fantasies, and it is certainly possible 
that ideas she developed in fantasies might have been adapted to feature in her philo-
sophical writings. But Sarasohn does not oﬀer this kind of nuanced analysis of the 
ideas in the diﬀerent kinds of writings. Instead, she prefers to see Cavendish’s writings 
as all of a piece. “What readers then and now have failed to grasp,” she tells us at one 
point (p. 39), “is that Cavendish’s decision to mix reason and fantasy is integral to her 
system: her natural philosophy could be understood only by combining the philo-
sophic and the fantastical.” I have to say that, if Sarasohn believes her account of 
174 Book Reviews / Early Science and Medicine 16 (2011) 162-177
Cavendish is now, for the ﬁrst time, showing us how to read the Duchess aright, I 
could not follow it. “For Cavendish,” we are told (p. 62), “there is a continuum between 
science and ﬁction. Both are equally important in elucidating her thought.” Sarasohn 
does not seem to realise that it is possible to agree that both aspects of her work are 
equally important, without having to conclude that we must therefore radically blur 
any diﬀerences between them. By calling equally on Cavendish’s works of fantasy and 
her philosophical writings to explicate her natural philosophy, Sarasohn ends up pre-
senting a baﬄingly weird Margaret Cavendish.
Sarasohn’s account is unhelpful in a number of other ways. She might have tried 
to elucidate the main principles of Cavendish’s thought, bringing out their similarities 
to earlier, or contemporary, ideas. But this would require a careful separation of the 
threads making up Cavendish’s philosophy. Sarasohn prefers to bring things together, 
however, rather than tease them apart. All too often she jumps from one thing to 
another, thereby presenting a Cavendish who ﬂits about and makes odd combinations. 
It seems that for Sarasohn this shows Cavendish’s genius—the ability to make imagi-
native leaps—but for this reader, at least, it revealed (or falsely created) an undisci-
plined, and even incompetent, Cavendish. My own reading of Cavendish’s belief in 
active, self-moving matter, for example, is that it is not so very diﬀerent from other 
theories of active matter being proposed by some of her contemporaries (including 
even Gassendi). According to Sarasohn, however, Cavendish’s matter is not just self-
moving, but alive, and even self-conscious. I am left wondering not only how I missed 
this talk of self-consciousness when I read Cavendish, but also whereabouts in her 
book Sarasohn actually presents the evidence for this. In so far as I can reconstruct it, 
Sarasohn seems to assume that Cavendish’s talk of some matter having reason equates 
with matter being self-conscious (though, to be fair, she never explicitly says this, she 
just tends to take self-conscious matter for granted—but see p. 58 where she writes: 
“Presumably, innate [Cavendish’s word for active] matter is self-conscious if it rules 
over other matter, but does that mean it is alive?”). 
In fact, Cavendish is committed to arguing for matter being capable of reasoning 
by her monistic materialism: just as the vegetable soul and the animal soul are material, 
so the rational soul also has to be material. Ergo, some matter is capable of reasoning. 
e matter of each of these three souls is thinner than the one below it in the hier archy, 
and the more tenuous matter is, the more spontaneously active it is (the latter idea is 
fairly common, being found even in the Queries to Newton’s Opticks, for example). 
As I say, it is possible to show how Cavendish ﬁts into the thought of her time; and 
what the fundamental ideas were that she took up, and how (and why) she modiﬁed 
them to make them her own. I never felt, however, that Sarasohn was doing this; she 
always seemed to prefer to show a Margaret Cavendish who was sui generis.
Another example is aﬀorded by the treatment of Cavendish’s religious views. Again, 
it seems to me that the Duchess’s lay theology, though unorthodox, is by no means 
completely separate from contemporary traditions. Nowhere does Sarasohn survey 
and analyse all the religious sentiments expressed throughout Cavendish’s works, 
although her religious beliefs crop up in passing in virtually every chapter. In spite of 
175Book Reviews / Early Science and Medicine 16 (2011) 162-177
the clear theism of these varied religious opinions, Sarasohn does not trouble to oﬀer 
a consistent account. On page 36 we are told that “Fideism remains constant through-
out her works,” and a few lines later that “Cavendish’s theology is nature worship at 
best and atheism at worse [sic].” While on page 45 Sarasohn implies that the expression 
“All things come from God Almighty” is pantheistic!
It is not possible to discuss Cavendish without considering the lessons of recent 
feminist scholarship and philosophy. Even here, however, Sarasohn does not use this 
material to the best advantage. From the historical perspective, her account does not 
help us to decide whether Cavendish’s philosophy was ridiculed because she was a 
woman, or because it was bad philosophy. To be fair, however, it is hard to see how 
this could be decided. Cavendish’s contemporaries would have expected a woman to 
write bad philosophy, because she was a woman, and would therefore have ridiculed 
her for the attempt as well as the execution. Sarasohn brings out well the fact that 
Cavendish, not so foolish that she cannot recognise her own intellectual shortcomings, 
sometimes blames her lack of education, but at other times (poignantly) accepts the 
standard view that women are mentally inferior to men. From a more feminist philo-
sophical perspective, however, Sarasohn might have done more. Acknowledging the 
claims of “diﬀerence feminism” (p. 11), “whereby women as a group are credited with 
a more holistic and empathetic understanding of nature,” Sarasohn simply presents a 
Cavendish whose natural philosophy is holistic, vitalistic, animated, anti-mechanical, 
and so forth, and implies that this is connected to the fact that she thinks like a woman. 
All this may in fact be true, but it would have been more satisfying, and much more 
useful, to see Sarasohn oﬀer a careful account of the relevant parts of Cavendish’s 
thought, weighing up whether it could be said to be signiﬁcantly more holistic, vital-
istic, or anti-mechanical than the thought of contemporary male philosophers, with 
a view to deciding whether “diﬀerence feminism” is correct, rather than allowing dif-
ference feminism to determine from the outset how Cavendish’s philosophy should 
be seen.
Sarasohn certainly gets it right, however, when she writes (p. 188) that “Cavendish 
provides a view of how the new science, the new world, and the new religions ignited 
the understanding and the imagination of those, either female or uneducated, who 
did not attend universities or meetings of scientiﬁc societies.” anks to the extent of 
her writings and their complexity, she ought to be regarded as much more interesting 
as an independent thinker than Menocchio, the now famous Friulian miller who 
developed his own cosmology. What Cavendish needs is a tribute to her thought to 
match Carlo Ginzburg’s tribute to Menocchio, e Cheese and the Worms (Baltimore, 
1980), but I am afraid this book is not it.
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